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Fischer on Foreknowledge and Explanatory Dependence

Philip Swenson

Abstract

I explore several issues raised in John Martin Fischer’s Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will. First I discuss whether an approach to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge that appeals directly to the claim that God’s beliefs depend on the future is importantly different from Ockhamism. I suggest that this dependence approach has advantages over Ockhamism. I also argue that this approach gives us good reason to reject the claim that the past is fixed. Finally, I discuss Fischer’s proposal regarding God’s knowledge of future contingents. I suggest that it may be able to secure comprehensive foreknowledge.

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References

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