On Propositional Platonism, Representation, and Divine Conceptualism

Authors

  • C. P. Ruloff Kwantlen Polytechnic University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v8i4.1763

Abstract

Gould and Davis (2014) have recently argued for the claim that Propositional Platonism is mistaken since it is not able to explain how a proposition comes to bear its representational properties. But, say Gould and Davis, if Propositional Platonism is mistaken, then Divine Conceptualism must be true and we should therefore identify propositions with the contents of a divine mind, i.e., God. In this paper, I argue that Gould and Davis’ argument against Propositional Platonism fails since it depends upon a number of assumptions that the Propositional Platonist need not accept.

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Published

2016-12-22

How to Cite

Ruloff, C. P. 2016. “On Propositional Platonism, Representation, and Divine Conceptualism”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (4):195-212. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v8i4.1763.

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