Reliability and the Border: The Discourse of the Czech Borderlands, 1945–49

Keywords: borderlands, communist dictatorship, ethnicity

Immediately after the World War II, the new borderlands population in Czech Lands was confronted with the notion of a community of “reliable citizens” capable of protecting the frontier and, consequently, the security of the nation and the state. Its logical counterpart was the “cleansing” and removal of all unwanted and “unreliable” inhabitants. This was not only state policy: Even more radical demands for resettlement where articulated by the local Czech-speaking population, especially by the new settlers in the borderlands. In the first two post-war years, these demands were directed mostly against the remaining Germans and other non-Slav ethnic groups. With time, however, it also affected other citizens and social groups. The rhetoric of recomposing society and eliminating “alien” elements remained similar after the Communist takeover in February 1948. This aspect of the Communist dictatorship was not an import, but rather an answer to a demand for “purification”, which had been articulated by a large part of the society.

Zuverlässigkeit und die Grenze: Der tschechische Grenzlanddiskurs 1945–49

Schlüsselwörter: Grenzgebiete, kommunistische Diktatur, Ethnizität


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State borders are special impassable zones that enable state authorities not only to control everyone who enters or leaves their territory, but often also to recreate or reshape communities living in this territory. In central and eastern Europe, they have mostly been perceived, at least in recent decades, as a characteristic instrument of Communist power. This is certainly true for most of the Czech historiography of the second half of the twentieth century. Despite this being common knowledge, it is still worth asking whether creating reliable border communities with the aim of bolstering the security function of the border really was an instrument imported from the Soviet Union and put into practice only after Communist parties had gained absolute power in the region. In this article, I seek to answer the question, using the example of post-war Czechoslovakia.

1. Continuities and discontinuities: Czech post-war history revisited?

The dominant discourse of modern Czech history is based on the opposition between the democratic tradition, which is generally said to be deeply rooted in Czech society since the interwar period, and the “totalitarian” oppression that came mostly from outside. In this view, the short post-war period between 1945 and 1948 has been interpreted as a struggle between democracy (or democratic political parties) and the emerging “totalitarianism” which was eventually established in late February 1948 (Broklová 2004; Kocian 2002; 2005). The latter date, from this perspective, represents a turning point in twentieth-century Czech history. After the Changes of late 1989, this interpretation of the 1948 events was a determining factor in the drafting of policy and legislation, as well as the institutional background for research on modern Czech history and for its interpretation.

Many aspects of Czech and Czechoslovak modern history (especially post-1945 history) relativize or even contradict this grand narrative. While the beginnings of the “totalitarian regime” have often been described in the dominant historiographical literature of the last two decades as a period with an extremely high degree of state-induced violence and an unprecedented number of victims, it is important to realize that between 1945 and 1947 the extent of the violence committed by the state, its security forces, and other bodies was far greater than in the “Stalinist” period that followed (1948–53).

According to the plans of the Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš and the London government in exile and in compliance with the international agreements, more than 3 millions of former German citizens were forcibly displaced from the territory of Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1947 (Brandes 2001; Staněk 1991 and 2005; van Arburg/Staněk 2010 and 2011; Ther/Siljak 1997). Especially in summer 1945, before the organised transfer began, many German villages in the borderlands had been “purged” by Czech military or semi-military units (Staněk/van Arburg 2005). According to the Czech-German historical commission, between 20 and 30 thousand Germans from Czech lands lost their life in the consequence of these events and of the following organised displacement. However, the decline of the state of law and massive state violence still is associated with the time after 1948 only in popular thought and in part of the traditionalist historiography.

Recent historiographical literature, written mostly by the younger generation of Czech and (to a greater extend) non-Czech scholars, already has pointed out some of these contradictions. Whereas Tomáš Staněk and Adrian von Arburg (von Arburg/Staněk 2010; 2011) or Benjamin Frommer (Frommer 2005) documented and analysed in their studies the high amount of violence in post-war Czech lands, a systematical comparison of physical violence before and after 1948
is still missing. Other scholars, as Muriel Blaive, however, showed the ambivalent attitude towards the border and border regime during the Communist dictatorship – and relativised the still dominant totalitarian paradigm (Blaive/Molden 2009).

In other central European historiographies, the emphasis of democratic traditions, which opposed the Communist dictatorial rule in the post-war situation, is not as dominant as in the Czech case. However, we can identify an important shift in the interpretation of post-1945 history – from victimization to the notion of distribution of responsibility and participation of the broader society in dictatorial rule, stigmatization of minorities, or state of emergency (Deák/Judt/Gross 2000). One of the most significant historiographical and popular discussions about this interpretative shift has taken place in the Polish case (Gross 2006; 2012; 2012).

By emphasizing mainly the continuities between the eras before and after 1948, it is important to realize the central role of social “cleansing”. This “vision of purity”, identified by Zygmunt Bauman as one of the most dangerous aspects of modernity (Bauman 1997), is in fundamental opposition to the idea of the rule of law, which ensures equal rights for every citizen, until he or she is sentenced by a legitimate court. The aim of the rule of law is to prosecute those who break the law, whereas the aim of revolutionary social cleansing is the construction of a united collective free from all potentially unreliable elements. To achieve this end, the authorities are allowed to circumvent, adapt, or even ignore existing norms, and also to create new ones hastily. The rulers of such a society are able to change things rapidly. But one can never precisely define the boundaries of the desired purity. Any system that prefers force and power to rules that apply equally to everyone makes room for state or Party intervention, influence-peddling, and corruption as its organic parts.

As this article seeks to demonstrate, the actual policy of cleansing, especially in the border regions of the Czech Lands, relativized the rule of law from the end of the war onward. It was characteristic of the period that particular “cleansing” operations of borderland communities were conducted without any support in existing legislation. The authorities sometimes used a radical redefinition of former legislation or chaotically drafted new laws, orders, decrees, ordinances, and regulations. This practice continued in a similar manner after the 1948 takeover.

The notion of “unreliability”, which became the central criterion in deciding whose civil rights were to be respected or ignored, was not new in the Czech or Czechoslovak context. Not only in popular thought, but also in legislation, this category had already been established in interwar Czechoslovakia under the “State Defence Act” of 1936. Although the act stipulates that “language, religion, or race can never be a reason for determining that anyone [any citizen] is unreliable with regard to the state”, in practice it was mainly “nationality” (národnost, in the sense of “ethnicity, not “citizenship”) which was decisive from the point of view of the local and regional authorities (Petráš 2009, 242–44). But the close discursive link between ethnicity and reliability (or unreliability) had been strengthened under the Nazi occupation.

When claiming that the security and impermeability of the border legitimized the violent recomposition and resettlement of the borderlands population even before the February 1948 takeover, one is at least indirectly also questioning the often single-cause explanations of the tradition of guarded borders and the impassable zones on either side of them. This does not of course mean that the interwar Soviet practice of cleansing the borderland population of the Soviet Union, especially ethnic minorities suspected of possible links to foreign states (Martin 1998), did not play an important role in post-war Czechoslovakia. The notion of the “western border of the Slavic peoples” and the Czech border-guard tradition were, however, definitely part of the discourse.
A list of all the “cleansing operations of the border region”¹² which were carried out in the three post-war years would be exceedingly long, so only a small selection will be analyzed here. In many cases, the discourse of reliable citizens, whose logical counterpart was the removing of all unwanted and unreliable inhabitants, was not just an aspect of state policy. Even more radical demands for cleansing and resettlement were articulated by the local Czech-speaking population, especially by new settlers in the borderlands. In the first two post-war years, these demands were directed mostly against the remaining ethnic Germans and other non-Slavic ethnic groups (such as new settlers of Gypsy or Hungarian origin) or against communities of ambiguous ethnicity (including “mixed” families, the inhabitants of the Bohemian-Austrian border region of Vitorazsko, and Croats living at the Moravian-Austrian border who had been accused, by the authorities or simply by members of the public, of having been involved in “Germanization”). With time, however, the suspicion of unreliability also affected other citizens and social groups who, the authorities felt, had to be expelled from the border regions.

A border that makes the inhabitants within it secure against external enemies is a traditional aspect of the purity-and-order ideology that predominated in post-war Czechoslovakia and was adopted by most of its inhabitants. The separation of the internal and the external is a logical counterpart of internal homogenization. In post-war Czechoslovakia, the declared necessity of securing and defending the state borders was used for justifying a consequent “cleansing” in the border regions, at least in the early years. The Czechoslovak border, an impassable and protected zone controlled by the most loyal Czechoslovak citizens, was fully established by 1946–47.

2. The border, ethnicity, and a reliable community at the grass-roots level

Till the 1940s the inhabitants of Vitorazsko (Weitra in German), a region on the Czech-Austrian border, defined themselves mainly in local terms. Some of them had declared themselves German since the 1920 and 1930 censuses, but others had declared their nationality as Czech. In fact, their national identity was ambiguous. Just a few days after the end of World War II, the authorities designated these people German and expelled them by force to Austria. After it was officially verified that hundreds of them had actually declared Czech nationality in the censuses before the war and had preserved a good knowledge of the Czech language in a mostly German-speaking milieu, the authorities were required to allow them to come back. As Czechs who were well integrated in a German milieu, they nevertheless seemed untrustworthy to the state authorities and to some of their fellow-citizens. Their ambiguous national identity was the reason a meeting was called at the Ministry of the Interior on 14 June 1946 to discuss “the removal of the unreliable population of Czech nationality from the Vitorazsko border region to other regions of the Czech Lands”. A ministerial decree was issued to determine which Vitorazsko inhabitants who had been allowed to return after having been expelled were nationally reliable or unreliable. The unreliable were not allowed to remain in areas close to the border. Ministry officials eventually found a “suitable” new home for them in the Teplá region, west Bohemia. In this part of the former Sudetenland, situated far away from the border, citizens who were designated “unreliable” were employed as farm labourers. Before this happened, the affected citizens tried to resist by means that reveal much about the logic of post-war ethnic cleansing. They sent a “collective request for a pardon in the matter of nationality”, thereby implicitly accepting the logic that designated having a “bad” nationality a criminal act that could only be forgiven, never justified.¹³ The Interior Ministry considered the operation a precedent. The authorities considered the prob-
lems that arose in this case to be important, for they could “make more difficult the necessary purification of the border areas from unreliable elements in other Czech border areas.”

The story of the south Bohemian unfortunates who before the 1930s would probably never have imagined that someone would have cared whether they were Czech or German is of course but a tiny part of post-war ethnic cleansing in Czechoslovakia, and Europe. Yet it is an important story, since it shows that since May 1945 the territories situated close to the border were considered special zones in which the authorities were allowed to “purify” society and to separate “unreliable” citizens from reliable ones more than in other regions. Here, near the border, “security reasons” justified actions that went much further than permitted by the presidential decrees. Even people whom the presidential decrees allowed to retain their Czechoslovak citizenship could not be sure that they really were reliable or loyal enough to deserve to live in the border regions.

First and foremost, almost all inhabitants “suspected of Germanness” (podezřelí z němectví, a commonly used term after May 1945) were thought unreliable with regard to the Czechoslovak state and nation. These people were often not of German ethnicity or even cultural identity, because many inhabitants of the former Sudetenland who had not declared Czech or Slovak nationality in the pre-war censuses were forced by Germans using unscrupulous means to declare German as their nationality. That applied to the Croats of south Moravia, another community unlucky enough to live near the border.

Since the Croats of Frélichov, Nový Přerov, and Dobré Pole, three villages in the Mikulov region, had lived with Germans for many generations and had to some extent co-operated with the German administration during the war, they were in danger of being accused of collaboration. This time, however, the authorities did not proceed as hastily as in Vitorazsko. Commissioners of the Moravian National Committee were installed in Croatian villages in 1946, and subsequently categorized the inhabitants into three groups, informally called “Germans”, “collaborators” and “harmless” (Němci, kolaboranti and nezávadní). The Ministry of Defence, which intended to settle returnees (members of the Yugoslav “Jan Žižka z Trocnova” partisan brigade) in the south Moravian countryside, insisted on the relocation of the first two groups of Croatian citizens (“Germans” and “collaborators”). Czech residents and the local People’s Party (Roman Catholic) defended their Croatian neighbours. Perhaps more important for the suspension of this forced migration, at least for some time, were the calculations of the National Committee of Mikulov district:

Since the measures against the guilty Croats would have to be implemented during the grain harvest, we are afraid that the inhabitants would not finish harvesting successfully. Consequently, the National Committee of Mikulov has suspended the implementation of its 30 June 1947 decision […] possibly till autumn.

In the end, only 311 of about 2,000 Croats from these three villages were relocated. But the intense pressure placed on them by the Ministries of Defence and the Interior, together with some provincial and regional institutions, provides persuasive evidence of the post-war attitude towards minority groups living near the state border.

3. The remaining Germans as the main suspects

The question of the reliability of the inhabitants of the border regions became even more urgent after the organized collective expulsion of the German-speaking population of Czechoslovakia,
because in 1947, for many reasons, some 200,000 ethnic German still remained in Czechoslovakia, many of them in the closed border areas. In newspaper articles and letters to the editor, the regions bordering on Germany in particular are described as being in need of rigorous purging of the “German element”. One article, for example, called for the expulsion of each and every German from here. Though many of the remaining Germans were permitted to stay in the country because they were considered “loyal” or at least “necessary”, this was not enough to meet the criteria being allowed to live near the border. Since international protests made expulsion from Czechoslovakia more difficult than before, only one means remained to solve the problem – forced relocation to the interior.

Though Czechoslovakia had nothing like Siberia, the authorities did manage to find ways to banish large groups of inhabitants on its relatively small territory even before the 1948 takeover. This instrument of state violence, used first against small groups of inhabitants like the Vitorazsko communities or the Croats of south Moravia bordering with Austria, was finally institutionalized in 1946, when thousands of Hungarians were moved to the Czech Lands from areas on the Slovak-Hungarian border. Seen in this context, it should come as no surprise that this instrument for remoulding and controlling society was used again when the problem of the remaining “unreliable” Germans arose.

From May to November 1947, the first wave of the so-called “dispersion” (rozptyl) began to be implemented. Afterwards, however, a feeling of dissatisfaction remained both in the Czech borderland society and in the Prague ministries. The borderlands were, in the government view, not yet nationally homogenized enough. Consequently, a second wave of forced migration to the Czech interior followed in March 1948, which lasted till the early months of 1949. (In this, however, only a few hundred people were affected after August 1948.) The winter interval between the two waves of forced migration to the interior was caused by temporary uncertainty about strategy and worries about international public opinion, which had protested against the inhumane circumstances of the deportations of Hungarians from Slovakia to the Czech Lands a year before.

Researchers who have analysed in detail the state-directed migrations of the German-speaking inhabitants to the Czech interior have documented between 30,000 and 40,000 people who were moved inland as part of the “relocation and dispersion” of Germans between 1947 and 1949. These people were robbed of their homes and often also their former occupations, and were put to work as farm labourers in the Czech interior instead.

Although the aim of the complete removal of Germans from the borderlands appeared in official documents and even more often in public speeches, the dispersion affected mainly those Germans who were to be expelled to Germany and stayed in Czechoslovakia in consequence of the American refusal to admit further trains of expellees into their zone. Some “industrial specialists” were, however, also sent into the Czech interior, when local national committees or state-owned companies failed to protect them. Ethnically mixed families and “antifascists” were not protected automatically either, and sometimes had to rely on various patrons.

The security of the state border was one of the most often mentioned justifications for the “dispersion” of Germans into the Czech interior. When the border security zone was established in 1946, to be inhabited only by people deemed “absolutely reliable with regard to the state and the nation”, the initiators of the policy were thinking primarily about segregating the Germans living here. The legal commentary justifies this measure by citing the threat of “neighbours from abroad penetrating the borderlands” and the necessity of leaving only loyal citizens in the border zones. The fact that it was the security of state borders which again was used for justifying ethnic cleansing and forced migration is confirmed by the words of Minister of the Interior Vá-
clav Nosek. In one of his last interviews about sending the remaining ethnic Germans to the Czech interior, Nosek claimed:

*The decision of the American administration in Germany regarding the temporary suspension of the transfer did of course cause some domestic political problems, and we had to deal with them in the interest of state security [...] Because the vast majority of the Germans designated for transfer had been concentrated in the areas near the state borders, it was decided to move these persons inland. This is the first step in a systematic and thoroughgoing campaign. The final goal of the campaign is to cleanse the liberated border regions of all elements deemed nationally or morally unreliable with regard to the state, and not permit them to remain permanently near the border.*

4. The construction of a reliable borderland community by state policy and popular demand

The consistent cleansing of the population near the border was not at all limited to the remaining German-speaking inhabitants or “elements suspected of Germanness”. In addition to the not particularly successful efforts to get people with criminal pasts out of the borderlands, the cleansing also concerned, for example, all 87 municipalities of Těšínsko, a small region at the Polish border.22 Těšínsko was viewed as such a nationally mixed area that one of the relevant plans suggested controlling it by administrative commissions comprising “reliable” Czech authorities from the interior.23 Even odder was the resistance of the security forces and the local Czech community to letting Gypsies stay near the border. The central authorities had also considered Gypsies “unreliable elements” in the early post-war years. Consequently, the Ministry of Defence welcomed the idea of interning the Gypsies in labour camps. The ministerial authorities requested, however, that those camps not be placed near the fifty-kilometre zone running along the state border. For reasons of state security, they argued, the camps should be placed in the interior of the Czech Lands.24 The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs also assumed that the “border zone would be cleansed of Gypsies” (Dvořák, 2003). State measures to control Gypsy job-hopping were in accord with all the other attempts to resettle the wide border zone with a homogeneous and loyal population. This was, however, often contrary to meeting the pressing need for labour in these abandoned regions.

Considering the assumed role of the returnees, the efforts to construct a reliable border-guard community was somehow absurd. In the context of the organized return of Czechs and Slovaks from abroad after 1945, the authorities claimed that because returnees had partly proved their patriotism by maintaining their identity in alien cultural milieus, they were even better qualified for the future defence of the state borders than were the settlers from the Czech interior, who had come to the borderlands with diverse motivations. At first, this belief was bolstered by the fact that those Czechs had served on the Eastern front (under Ludvík Svoboda in alliance with the Red Army) and were presumed to have anti-German spirit. That was why the Volhynia Czechs were compared with the Chods (*Chodové*, walkers), the legendary border-guards of south-west Bohemia. Authors of many newspaper articles presumed that these people, who were generally seen as fair-minded farmers and brave warriors, would be the best border protection. According to these plans, the Volhynia returnees should settle in the border regions to the west and north of the traditional region of the “Chodové”, to ensure a “strong bulwark of the homeland”.25 At the
same time, however, many returnees coming from predominantly German places like Vienna or Upper Silesia soon surprised the local authorities with their lack of fluency in Czech and, indeed, signs of intensive assimilation into the German cultural milieu. For that reason, the Ministries of the Interior, Education, Agriculture, Information, and Foreign Affairs were for several months seriously concerned with the communities of Czechs from Oppeln (Opole) and Strehlen (Strzelin), who had settled in the west Bohemian border regions. In agreement with the local functionaries, the ministries voiced their concerns about the reliability of these “Germanized colonizers”. As an employee of the Ministry of Education reported immediately after the returnees arrived in the town of Loket: “We have our doubts whether these invited colonizers are going to be good and reliable border guards. We feel it would probably be better for our state, if these people had an opportunity to assimilate into the purely Czech milieu in the interior.”

The social “cleansing” of the population near the state border, more thorough than elsewhere in post-war Czechoslovakia, was a spontaneous act carried out by various authorities and the security forces in the early months after the World War II. The Ministry of Defence, however, tried as early as in summer 1945 and then intensively during 1946 to institutionalize a special statute of the border zones and border regions “in the interest of state defence”. This actually meant increasing the power of the ministry on these territories. In his instructions of June 1946, the Minister of Defence stated:

*Only the most reliable citizens of Czech or other Slavic nationality should be settled in the border regions, a reliable element, a moral and economic support of our state in peacetime and at war on the border. The unreliable citizens have to be transferred away from the border territory and settled in the interior. For this reason, the Ministry of Defence has the right to examine the reliability of the settlers in the border regions […]. Our officers will hand over to other ministries requests for the immediate transfer of unreliable elements […]. Since this is a state priority, we appeal for a rigorous procedure.*

Since this position of the Ministry of Defence met with a positive response from the whole administration, the institutionalized examination of the reliability of citizens in the border zones was carried out in 1946 and 1947. The official commentary on the 1947 “Act Establishing the Border Zone” remarks that the cleansing of the borderland population “will surely be welcomed by the majority of inhabitants in these regions, since their security will also be ensured by these measures”.

Various local institutions and political actors were assigned the task of registering and reporting on potentially unreliable people in the border areas. Many of them interpreted the ministerial goals idiosyncratically, so much so that even the strict headquarters of the Ministry of Defence sometimes had to reject some of the fragmentary reports as being unfounded. In 1947, ministry employees had to draw the attention of the national committees in the borderlands to the fact that their descriptions of various people as “lazy, unreliable”, or simply “unreliable”, or “a poacher, unreliable” could not be accepted as sufficient argument to expel those people.

5. Conclusion

The main thesis of the article is that a special border regime comprising repression, resettlement, and homogenization in the borderlands was a precondition, not a result, of the formation of the
“Communist dictatorship” and “Sovietization” in the Czech Lands in the second half of the 1940s. The social engineering that affected the new borderlands population in 1945–49 was legitimized by referring to the necessity of creating a community of “reliable citizens” capable of guarding the frontier and, consequently, the security of the nation and the state. The rhetoric of reconstructing society and eliminating “alien” elements, which accompanied the creation of a new borderland community after the Communist takeover, was similar to the rhetoric of the years before. With regard to border politics, the way to dictatorship was already paved by this ethos. From this perspective, the Communist dictatorship was not only an import that came to oppress most Czechs but also a response to the demand for purification, which had, most intensively in connection with securing the border, been articulated not merely by “Communist” and “democratic” political actors but by a large part of society.

NOTES

1 This thesis has been documented in various publications of the state-run Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes, Prague (see, for example, Tomek 2009). Of recent publications, see, for example, Jílek’s book about the Czechoslovak-German border after 1948 (Jílek 2011).

2 This attitude towards post-war Czechoslovakia and especially the Communist period is deeply rooted not only in the first generation of post-1989 scholars like Karel Kaplan (1995; 1993). But the attitude is also prevalent among younger scholars often affiliated with the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes (Bursík 2009; Blažek et al. 2010; Vaněk 2008).

3 The political system of the so-called “third republic” (1945–1948) was characteristic by a limited plurality of political parties, associated in the so-called “National front”. The biggest political party of interwar period, the agrarian party, was prohibited because of its alleged collaboration with the German National socialist occupation authorities. However, democracy also was limited by censorship and the state of law was endangered by the strengthening of the executive (ruling by the instrument of presidential decrees in 1945 till October the 28th), by the partial expropriation of property and by the disrespecting of basic individual laws of a great part of the former (non-Czech and non-Slovak) citizens. More about the “third republic” in Kocián (2005) or Brenner (2009).

4 By law, the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes must systematically exclude the period between 1945 and 1948 from its research, since only the “totalitarian” periods of 1938–45 and 1948–89 fall within its mandate.


6 Many of these contradictions are thematized and some of the dominant discourses opposed in one of my recent books about minorities in Czech borderlands (Spurný 2011).

7 The question of the reconstruction or decline of the state of law in the post-war era has been discussed in a European perspective. The issue of retribution plays a central role in this debate (Deák/Gross/Judt 2000).

8 Whereas the term “cleansing” has mostly been used in connection with plans and practice of physical extermination or forced displacement of different ethnic groups (ethnic cleansing, see Ther/Siljak 1997) in historiographical literature, I am using this term in a more broader sense – as a discourse of modernity and practice of social engineering, with the intention to remove certain social or ethnic groups from a territory or community. Hereby, I am referring to the argumentation of Zygmunt Bauman (1989, 1991) or Gerd Koenen (1998). Concerning the context of post-war Czech lands, Benjamin Frommer uses the word “cleansing” to describe the policy of retribution after 1945 (Frommer 2005) and Eagle Glassheim is using the same term describing the forced displacement of Germans from Czechoslovak territory in 1945–1947 (Glassheim 1997). Stanisław Jankowiak is doing the same while analysing the Polish case (Jankowiak 1997). Even closer to the notion of this article is the argumentation of David Gerlach (Gerlach 2010).

9 See for example NA [National Archive], f. 315/1 (ÚPV) [The Government Presidium Department], k. 1027, sg. 1361/17, Osidlování obranného pohraničního pásma, porada na ÚPV, 22 October 1946.

10 When the German administration took over sovereign power in the hived-off Sudentenland, German citizenship law was applied there, which since 1933 had developed from an institution of the rule of law into a political tool of racial segregation. A uniform citizenship was replaced by graduated classes of rights based on ethno-racial criteria which applied for the area of the former Czechoslovakia. “German” or “non-German nationality” became the determining and compulsory attribute for the acquisition or deprivation of German citizenship. After occupation of the remaining Czech territory and the setting up of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, the criteria of ethno-
racial selection qua citizenship became even more stringent. Only “German national inhabitants” of the Protectorate became German citizens and citizens of the Reich. The remaining inhabitants of the Protectorate of “Czech nationality” were given the new, separate—and inferior—status of citizen of the Protectorate (not of the German Reich).

11 NA, f. 850 (AMV-Nosek) [Archive of the Ministry of Interior – Arch. Fond of minister Václav Nosek], k. 255, K osídlování pohraničí, podzim 1947.

12 For some of those not mentioned here, see NA, f. 850 (AMV-Nosek), k. 16, čj. 1731/46, merged with 1606/46, Vnitřní korespondence MV k otázce „Očištění pohraničního pásma od živlů státně a národně nespolehlivých“, 7 February 1947.

13 NA, f. 315/1, (ÚPV), k. 1024, sg. 1361/4, Společná prosba o udělení milosti ve věci národnosti, 13. července 1945.

14 NA, f. 315/1, (ÚPV), karton 1028, sg. 1361/17, Osislování obranného pohraničního pásma, 16. října 1946.

16 Concerning the state policy towards remaining Germans in Czechoslovakia in 1947 to 1953 see von Arburg (2004).

17 “Co s neodsunutými Němcí?”, Náš hranicář, I/8, 27 September 1946, pp. 15–16.

18 Von Arburg, for example, mentions 28,701 people whose presence in documented train-loads, that were carried out, 88 further trains without lists of deported persons (between four and five thousand people), and 6,478 people who had to be moved, but of whom there is no evidence that the deportations were carried out (von Arburg 2004, 344).

19 NA, AÚV KSČ [Archive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia], f. 100/24 (Klement Gottwald), k. 45, sl. 854, fol. 218–225), Memorandum o zřízení správních komisí na území Těšínského Slezska v obcích s většinou státně nespolehlivého obyvatelstva, [1945/46].

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