Military cooperation, transatlantic relations and military non-alliance – a conceptual analysis with a focus on the cases of Finland and Sweden

1. Introduction: military cooperation and its implications for European security

Military cooperation has an enlarging and growing role in the transformation of the European security order that has entered the second post-Cold War decade. At the same time, the interaction over a wide scope of military and defence issues has become a key challenge for the foreign and security policies of states as actors in the unification of Europe. Defence policies and military doctrines, adapted to the requirements and possibilities in the security and integration environment, are shaping the security order as its essential elements.1

The nature and substance of international military cooperation has changed over the past decade. A complex array of internal and local conflicts and disputes have emerged as security risks and challenges that concern not only the direct parties but also other states concerned about such spill-over effects as the spread of political instability, the danger of escalation and the regression of transition and integration processes underway since the end of the division of Europe. Simultaneously, traditional military threats against territorial integrity have continued to diminish for the large majority of states, although the arrangements established for openness in defence policies, armaments projects and military activities and the assessment of defensive-offensive capabilities remain on the security agenda for all responsible and competent actors.

Consequently, crisis management has emerged as the new main focus of military co-
operation, but it remains part of a broader practice of cooperative security. The use of military means by states and international institutions for such missions as peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and humanitarian intervention is embedded within cooperative security management across the entire conflict cycle that entails also early warning and conflict prevention as well as post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. Facing a growing set of tasks that may include the militarily robust separation of parties as well as the politically sensitive cooperation between political and military missions on the field, defence establishments everywhere are engaged in restructuring and reconfiguration that may turn out to be as demanding as the build-up effort aimed at stemming the Cold War confrontation was in its time.

The concept and practice of military cooperation extends beyond crisis management in its varying and developing forms. Defence-related support is provided for states that are reconstructing, reforming and restructuring their armed forces for tasks related to national or collective defence and international responsibilities by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in its Partnership for Peace (PfP) programmes and Membership Action Plans (MAP) as well as by countries in regional contexts such as the Baltic Security Assistance (BALTSEA) coordinated by a number of Nordic and western states. Military-to-military cooperation is aimed at contributing to the overall transition support for recipient states in the value-based unification of the geopolitical space covered by the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) and the enlargement of European integration.

Finally, military cooperation is not only a challenge for transition states, it has acquired a new urgency among the established democracies and members of NATO and the European Union (EU). Faced with the dynamics of high-technology at the core of the Revolution of Military Affairs and the growing but unpredictable demands for their indispensable contribution to military crisis management, these states are struggling to develop effective armaments cooperation and new institutional solutions for joint missions and to close the widening gap between the United States and its European allies and partners in the generation and modernisation of military resources.

**Explaining the new military cooperation**

As an element shaping the European security order, military cooperation is driven by a wide range of factors that can be related to all the principal theories or explanatory models of International Relations.²

Primarily, military cooperation can be viewed as another task for multilateral or inter-state management, where institutions and regimes serve as platforms for states’ cooperative efforts based on common gains to be won in the reduction of transaction costs and improved efficiency of outcomes. In neoliberalism, and the institutionalist approach in general, military cooperation is envisioned and pursued along a progressive path towards such goals as stability and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. As institutions and other arrangements grow and adapt in their performance capability, security problems are mitigated, solved and overcome through cooperation based on common rules and practices.

At the same time, military cooperation can be explained in neorealist terms, as persuasion arranged, led and shaped by actors pursuing their security interests within a recurring power structure. Institutions and other multilateral arrangements reflect or reinforce power relations, notably the aggregation of the military capabilities of the United States and NATO, the recent assertion of the EU onto the military-security scene and the weakened position of Russia in shaping and determining European security, while actors in conflict regions remain objects of policies.

Finally, military cooperation may be seen as political and social construction reflecting the significance of values and other ideational factors such as identity in international relations, as proposed by constructivist and critical theories. Accordingly, NATO membership is not viewed merely as a security-seeking strategy of
balancing against potential threats but also as a process of self-identification and an act of belonging in the political and economic western community. Likewise, the development of common security and defence policy within the EU can be considered a natural part of comprehensive and deepening integration, resulting from the socialisation process of policy-makers and the Europeanisation of member-states’ foreign policies. 3

On the actor level, participation in military cooperation has become indispensable for the foreign and security policies of states – whatever their alignment or orientation in the Cold War system – in transatlantic and all-European relations. The internationalisation of the doctrine and practice of defence policy can be accounted for as adaptation of a state towards its security milieu. Moreover, states do not act only on a national basis but membership of security-related international organisations affects their policy preferences and outcomes. A particular challenge to the theoretical foreign policy analysis is presented by the impact of membership of the EU on foreign and security policies of states as actors and societies (Manners/Whitman 2000).

The following analysis deals with the participation of the militarily non-allied member-states of the EU in military cooperation in Europe and, in particular, the implications of non-alliance for their role in transatlantic relations. Particular attention is devoted to Finland and Sweden, which are presented as case studies. In conclusion, references are made to the principal explanatory models in assessing the impact of military non-alliance in transatlantic relations.

2. Shaping European and transatlantic relations

The response of the international community to the broad scope of security challenges in the post-cold war era has brought institutionalism to the fore as the natural point of departure for theoretical and analytical explanation. Security-related international institutions are adapting to perform their tasks in an increasingly complex environment. Moreover, institutions are becoming hybrid in order to combine different security functions from the management of risks and the resolution of disputes to the aggregation of power to confront threats (Wallander/Keohane 1999).

The order of international institutions in the security field has gone through a structural and substantive change. While the United Nations (UN) and the OSCE, as universal institutions, were featured in the immediate post-Wall years as the mandating and lead institutions for traditional peacekeeping, NATO has entered the scene as the institution of choice for organising and conducting what has emerged as more demanding and complex military crisis management operations forced by the conflicts in the Balkans. More recently, the European Union has launched a process of creating a capability for autonomous military crisis management operations, gaining a new operative dimension for the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP) and supplanting the Western European Union (WEU), which is being phased out as an active organisation.

Among the inclusive institutions, the UN, while remaining responsible for a collective security system, is promoting the overall framework of the community of member-states for crisis management while operations are increasingly sub-contracted or delegated to regional institutions. The OSCE is engaged primarily in conflict prevention and civilian crisis management while preparing a capability for military crisis management as a regional arrangement under the UN Charter.

Among the exclusive institutions, NATO has transformed from a military alliance proper to a security management institution, while maintaining its core function of collective defence. The EU has enlarged its operative responsibilities to the area of common defence policy, leaving out common defence as represented by the mutual security guarantee of a defence alliance, while maintaining and developing its capabilities in political, economic and humanitarian aspects of security management. Moreover, both NATO and the EU connect to most if not all of the other OSCE states within a network of bi-
lateral and multilateral outreach arrangements. Russia remains a special partner of both institutions and their members.

As the engine of military cooperation in Europe, the transatlantic relationship is affected by the broader context of developments in Europe and beyond. Military cooperation has become an arena where NATO is asserting its power in Europe and the role of the United States is being emphasized as its leading force. At the same time, transatlantic relations are being adjusted to the introduction of European, global and regional security issues into the bilateral relationship between the United States and the EU and to the establishment and implementation of an EU-NATO consultation and cooperation mechanism in crisis management.

The militarily non-allied members of the European Union, which do not belong to NATO, have adapted their foreign and security policies to engage in European integration, to share in the transatlantic link through the EU-US dialogue and the PfP, while maintaining the membership option, and to contribute to common security in the OSCE space and its subregional contexts. In all those dimensions, they have made choices regarding military cooperation that conform with their position on independent or separate self-defence.

3. Post-neutrals, security, and integration in Europe

The established neutral states (Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Ireland) had strengthened and consolidated their positions towards the end of the Cold War as recognised contributors to security and stability in the East-West system (Hakovirta 1988). While providing good offices in European security and cooperation, disarmament and peacekeeping, the neutrals enhanced directly and indirectly their own security. The sufficiency and credibility of their defence was measured as their capability to protect territorial integrity in a side theatre of a larger conflict – not against a separate attack by a major power – and the resources and skills needed for international missions were limited to traditional stationary UN peacekeeping to which they were major contributors. Although they considered themselves members of the western democratic community of states by their political and economic systems, the neutrals were not party to the institutionalised political or military cooperation within NATO or the European Community (EC).

Although the neutrals continued to have a mediating role for some time in the transition from the Cold War to the New Europe, they realised that peacetime neutrality defined as impartiality in great-power conflicts had no role any more for themselves or for European security at large. They were engaged like any other states in maintaining, promoting and protecting the value-based accountability regime established for the CSCE/OSCE area by the Paris Charter of 1990 marking the end of the division in Europe.4

A new challenge was presented to the security policy adaptation of the post-neutrals by the stepping up of NATO as a security management institution opening towards enlargement and cooperating with non-members and by the development of the European Union and its common foreign and security policy, which included defence policy aspirations and the possibility of common defence. These developments launched the engagement of the post-neutral states, which were contemplating accession to the EU initially for compelling economic reasons but also for political and security reasons (Luif 1995), in transatlantic politics with military implications. As a result, the post-neutrals remained discernible as a category of states in the post-division Europe, while Central and Eastern European states, which had but a long-term perspective for EU membership, turned to NATO membership as their immediate recipe for security concerns.

Although there have been differences in the timing and the substantive emphasis of actions, all the cold war neutrals have embarked upon a similar double-track policy of membership of the EU and partnership with NATO – even Switzerland, which has remained outside the EU, has joined the PfP. In the context of accession to the EU, Finland, Sweden and Austria confirmed
their commitment without reservations to the goals of the CFSP, including the provisions of the (Maastricht) Treaty on European Union (TEU) that refer to common defence policy and common defence (Kuosmanen 2001, 232–234). Together with this political and legal commitment, the behaviour of the former neutrals as new members has confirmed that military non-alliance does not restrict or limit equal and full participation in the CFSP.

The steps of engagement in deeper security policy cooperation have been taken by the former neutrals within the policy of military non-alliance, without joining NATO and without being faced with a decision on adopting common defence as members of the EU. When several elements in the transatlantic and Euro-Atlantic dimensions of the international security equation have been changing and evolving — NATO, the PfP, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the EU, the CFSP, enlargement of NATO and enlargement of the EU — the post-neutrals have been part of the transformation without a particular need or pressure to align militarily but, at the same time, without renouncing such an option in either case, NATO or the EU/CFSP.

**Finland and Sweden as case studies**

The relationship between military non-alliance and military cooperation in the transatlantic and euroatlantic contexts can be approached through the cases of Finland and Sweden.

In a series of initiatives and representations, Finland and Sweden have ascertained their policy of active participation and engagement in the development and implementation of the security and defence dimension of the CFSP of the European Union and the operationalisation and application of the partnership of NATO while reaffirming their membership option. They confirmed their right to equal participation in all EU activities and missions as full members, including situations in which the Union takes recourse to the assets and capabilities of the western defence alliance (the WEU, NATO). They also asserted the need for a legitimate and effective role for non-members in preparation and decision-making on combined operations led by NATO in the PfP framework. And finally, Finland and Sweden have established themselves as dialogue partners with NATO on implications of its enlargement for European and Northern European stability and security as well as innovative contributors to subregional political-military security in their immediate environment shaped by the enlargement of the EU and NATO.5

Although slight differences remain in the adjustment of their foreign and security policy doctrines from broad peacetime neutrality to the maintenance of military non-alliance as its residual core, and in their overall strategies towards the development of the Union, Finland and Sweden have pursued an identical or similar approach to security and military cooperation within the transatlantic community and to the protection and promotion of their national and regional security interests.6

4. Coping with NATO transformation and enlargement

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the division of Europe into two opposing military alliances, Finland and Sweden — like Austria and Switzerland — remained non-allied without any compelling consideration of an alternative defence solution. There was no security deficit or obvious threat that should or would be solved by accession to NATO nor was there a need to join NATO as a confirmation of democratic identity and transition, unlike the Central European states, which soon took up NATO membership as a key instrument in their integration with the New Europe.

What emerged for Finland and Sweden was the need to assure a proper presence in – and influence on – decisions and arrangements that closely affect their security and that are managed primarily by NATO or within the PfP framework as part of their broader engagement in cooperative security in Europe. Moreover, there remained the issue of NATO membership as an option to be called upon in case of change in the security situation or as a possibility to be
upheld as the right of every state to choose or change its security policy arrangements. Such a two-pillar policy towards NATO has served Finland and Sweden throughout the first post-Cold War decade and into the continued transformation of Europe in the second decade.

**PfP, regional security and membership**

Although the first bilateral contacts with NATO as an institutional partner were joined with inflated public attention and political symbolism, in particular Finland’s observer status with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1992, it soon became evident that the motivating factors for the non-allied post-neutrals in their adherence to the PfP were the need to continue to contribute to European military security through the emerging leading institutional arrangement (NATO/PfP) and, secondly, to gain from the practical lessons learnt from the bilateral cooperation on defence planning with NATO (Individual Partnership Programme; Planning and Review Process, PARP) for the modernisation and restructuring of their national defence forces.7

By joining the PfP and engaging in the PARP process with an ambitious programme for promoting interoperability, Finland and Sweden are enhancing their ability to contribute further to joint NATO-led missions with growing military demands.

At the same time, with their experience and tradition in UN peacekeeping and the broad social background and professional civilian expertise of their troops recruited from the reserves, Finland (and Sweden) can provide a particularly suitable input to comprehensive international and inter-institutional missions such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo, where they are involved in the NATO-led SFOR and KFOR forces.8

Finland and Sweden have been active in the strengthening and improvement of the position of partners in political consultation and decision-making, operational planning and command arrangements concerning their contribution to NATO-led missions. Although a guidelines document (the Political-Military Framework, PMF) on principles and modalities for the participation of partner countries in NATO-led PfP operations was adopted in 1999, its implementation in the case of KFOR was not satisfactory and the issue of legitimate access to NATO/PfP planning structures remains on the agenda for non-allied PfP partners.9

Finland has asserted that attaining interoperability and cooperating in the field with NATO troops not only contribute to the development of the national defence but also make more effective the reception and use of international assistance, which Finland can call upon in crisis even as a UN member. One of the three readiness brigades being developed by the Finnish Defence Forces is spearheading, as NATO interoperable, through the reinforced PfP/PARP programme.10 Sweden has a declared goal of making its entire defence forces interoperable with NATO, which indirectly serves mutual cooperation in crises affecting Sweden as well, although it has not accentuated the reception of assistance in defence doctrine.11 Moreover, Sweden has a particularly active and high profile as a participant and lead nation in PfP and in the spirit of the PfP exercises in the Baltic Sea region.

As for the NATO option in security doctrine, Finland and Sweden maintain a similar practical argument, which states that by contributing to stability and security in the Baltic Sea region their military non-alliance best promotes their national security as well under the prevailing conditions. The stabilising role of the Finnish and Swedish doctrines is a reference to the most serious regional security concern, a potential conflict involving Russia and the Baltic States, as well as the most serious international security concern, Russia’s potential reactions to NATO enlargement up to its borders.

While Finland and Sweden demonstrate a particular consideration of regional security issues and Russia’s concerns, they do not restrict their freedom of action nor do they endorse or accept the freezing or cementing of the prevailing situation in the Baltic Sea region as separate from the overall security order in the OSCE area. The freedom of choice principle and the
need for flexibility remain key underlying factors in their regional security policies.

Furthermore, Finland and Sweden see themselves as contributors to a comprehensive process of change that affects Northern Europe as well as Europe as a whole. Their approach was promoted in 1998 in a joint initiative that contained an offer of additional military confidence- and security building measures (CSBMs) with neighbours in the region, based on the overall OSCE regime, while rebutting Russian ideas for a closed regional security order based on great-power guarantees or a special position for Russia. At the same time, the Finnish-Swedish initiative endorsed regional multilateral cooperation in non-military fields and the rational and pragmatic use of European and transatlantic institutions, including the EAPC, for the promotion of cooperative security in Europe through a regional focus.

Finland states in its security and defence doctrine that NATO membership remains an option although it is not on the active policy agenda. The doctrine indicates that membership is conditioned by external and internal factors that will have to change for the membership issue to be taken up for decision-making. Sweden does not maintain an option as openly in its declared doctrine and it has adhered to the formulation where non-participation in military alliances in peacetime aims at retaining the possibility of neutrality in war in the vicinity. On the other hand, in the Swedish public arena there are significant players, such as leading news media, experts and political parties that support or campaign openly for accession to NATO. In Finland there is no corresponding notable domestic political pressure for membership, although the topic comes up regularly in public discussion. The public opinion is clearly against NATO membership in both countries.\(^{12}\)

Facing the issue of enlargement

While NATO membership has not emerged as an issue requiring direct decisions by Finland and Sweden, they have been faced with its implications indirectly through the process of NATO enlargement. The issue arose as a distinct challenge to their security policy when the decision on the first wave of new members became imminent in 1996–1997. In a joint memorandum to NATO, Finland and Sweden expressed their interests and concerns and offered their cooperation based on NATO’s commitment...
to an enlargement process that would enhance European security at large. By engaging NATO in a dialogue on the implications of enlargement, Finland and Sweden established themselves as recognized partners with legitimate concerns and security producers. 13

As NATO was preparing a special charter arrangement with Russia as an effort to acknowledge Russia’s great-power position without giving it a veto on enlargement, a natural concern of Finland and Sweden was to make sure that no decisions concerning their security or their region would be made above their heads in such a great-power arrangement. Moreover, the initiative towards NATO signalled a permanent interest by Finland and Sweden in safeguarding their region from any undue or unreasonable side-effects from a conflict over enlargement. At the same time, they were expressing confidence in NATO’s intentions towards overall European security and stressing the Baltic States’ right to choose their own security policy line. Moreover, Sweden and Finland jointly conducted a parallel discussion with Russia during the formative period connected with the first wave of enlargement and Russia’s responses that included its proposal for a closed regional security system.14

Finland and Sweden were drawn into the politics of NATO enlargement in the North also by the active policy of the United States towards the Baltic States and Northeastern Europe at large. Early on in the debate, Finland and Sweden were presented by US analysts as key regional players capable of promoting objectives common with those of the United States and NATO.15 Finland and Sweden supported the transition and consolidation of the Baltic States by political, economic as well as defence assistance for the construction of their national defence forces. Finland and Sweden would also have a key role in speeding up the admittance of the Baltic States to membership of the EU as an alternative or complementary measure to their potential NATO membership.

Consequently, the non-alliance of Finland and Sweden has been a position widely supported and accepted by the leading NATO powers as well as Russia. As the second wave of NATO enlargement is approaching in 2002, with a growing possibility of a Baltic dimension,16 Finland and Sweden continue to be involved in the process as contributors and demanders. Russia clearly expects them to adhere to the policy of non-alliance, while the United States, as the main protagonist and leader of the policy of enlargement, expects Finland and Sweden to play a continued stabilising and mitigating role whichever way the decision might go – as contributors to the continued stability and transition of the Baltic States, in case of no NATO enlargement in the region, or possibly by joining NATO as well or otherwise softening the effect of a Baltic accession in Russia’s eyes. While the Nordic members of NATO, Denmark, Norway and Iceland, are active proponents of Baltic membership, Finland and Sweden are hard pressed to indicate their position beyond merely referring to the freedom of choice principle.

As Sweden emphatically, and also Finland, shy away from being given any kind of a guarantor status vis-à-vis the security of the Baltic States, they cannot be involved in the decision that is to be made by the NATO members. Consequently, Sweden and Finland do not give direct advice on, or pretend to be able to promote NATO membership for the Baltic States. Sweden seems to promote the inevitability of Baltic membership as part of European transition. While Finland has come to acknowledge the increased likelihood of Baltic memberships, it stresses its role in promoting EU enlargement as the effective contribution to regional stability. While emphasizing that Baltic memberships are not against its security interests, Finland refrains from making concrete predictions on their consequences to regional security.17

While the second round of NATO enlargement seems to intensify the political linkage of the process with the position of Finland and Sweden as non-allied regional players, it will also reconfirm the difference between their policy on NATO membership and that of the Baltic States. At the same time, Finland and Sweden continue to remain effective interlocutors of the United States because of their strategic position and policy of military non-alliance.
Summing up

The agenda of military cooperation between Finland and Sweden, as militarily non-allied states, and NATO consists of three issue-areas: practical cooperation in crisis management within the PfP framework, dialogue on NATO enlargement and its regional implications, and respect for the right of choice related to the option of membership. Viewed from the Finnish and Swedish perspectives, the relations with NATO in each of these issue-areas are guided and affected differently by the explanatory factors of management, power and identity (see Figure 1).

As for the option of NATO membership, Finland and Sweden have retained their freedom of choice, while any decisions changing their non-alliance status are influenced and shaped by a broad spectrum of domestic, social and political factors that make membership a broad issue of identity construction as well. Due to their geopolitical situation, as applicants and invitees Finland and Sweden would be faced with the realities of strategic power calculations by the US and NATO at large. Institutional and managerial arrangements would not present a major obstacle because of their established democratic systems and the progress in military interoperability produced by the intensive work within PfP cooperation and based on existing credible national defence systems.

5. Enhancing the role of the EU in the field of security and defence

Membership of the European Union is the main platform for the militarily non-allied countries in their engagement in shaping political and military security in Europe and is also their most effective channel in influencing transatlantic relations. Although the EU has long remained – and still primarily is – a political, economic and humanitarian actor, it is in the development of the integration and common policies of the Union where Finland and Sweden, as well as Austria and Ireland (Keohane 2001), have been realigning their neutrality conceptions and adapting their foreign and security policies, and more recently, also their defence doctrines.

In a broader context, changes in the security and defence policies have been part of the overall adaptation process brought about by membership of the EU. In the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy, a growing array of assessments, decisions and actions take place within the Union and through the CFSP mechanism. For the former neutrals, past beliefs and conceptions of neutrality form a particular area of adaptation. Although national defence proper – whether separate (independent) or common defence – remains domain privé as long as an article V commitment is not adopted as part of the TEU, the security and defence policy of

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Figure 1. Explaining the agenda of military cooperation

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Note: Rank order of factors guiding and affecting the relations of Finland and Sweden as non-allied states with NATO over the main three issue-areas.
members remains under the influence of several other factors.

Finland and Sweden stress the role of the EU as an amplifier of their influence in international affairs and, more indirectly, as a contributor to their security. Consequently, they are willing and prepared to contribute to strengthening the efficiency of the CFSP both institutionally and in joint outcomes.

The Finnish-Swedish initiative of 1996 on introducing the security and defence dimension as a practical and concrete common policy into what became the Amsterdam Treaty was aimed at strengthening the capability of the Union in international security beyond its previous role in political and economic matters. The initiative had three main objectives, namely, introducing the Petersberg tasks as membership obligations, strengthening the operative link between the EU and the WEU in conducting such operations, and securing for the militarily non-allied members a position on equal footing in planning and decision-making related to such EU-led operations.18

At the same time, the Finnish-Swedish initiative guided the work towards military crisis management – and armaments cooperation – as the operative substance of common defence policy and kept out the issue of common defence, which was promoted in the competing proposal by Germany and France on the step-by-step integration of the WEU into the EU. There was no consensus for the introduction of common defence and the Finnish-Swedish initiative was effectively adopted at Amsterdam, while common defence was reaffirmed as a possible finalité goal requiring a unanimous decision. The outcome confirmed the assessment made by the new members that their specific position in the defence area would not limit their participation or influence in the CFSP.

As the next step was taken by the EU after the 1998 St. Malo initiative of France and the UK, followed by consecutive decisions in the Cologne and Helsinki summits of 1999, there was no difficulty for Finland and Sweden to support, and actively shape, the further development of the common security and defence policy.

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has not included or activated the discussion on a common defence commitment but has retained the concept of the Petersberg tasks as the operative focus. As for the transfer of certain functions and bodies from the WEU to the EU, the Finnish-Swedish approach even prior to Amsterdam was to stress the role of the Union as the institution making the decisions and taking the political responsibility in the conduct of European operations. The EU-WEU model was never tested and remained too complicated to work. The decision to make the EU the institution that would not only plan and decide upon but also conduct European military crisis management operations conformed with the CFSP philosophy of Finland and Sweden. Moreover, the ESDP strengthened their equal position as full members of the Union throughout the process of crisis management, as the complicated arrangements within the WEU framework were replaced.

Consequently, Finland played a major role during its Presidency in the negotiations on the headline goal and the principles, institutions and mechanisms of the ESDP that were adopted at the Helsinki Summit of 1999. During its Presidency in the first half of 2001, Sweden pursued an active role in the implementation of the decisions adopted at the Nice European Council towards making the ESDP operational by the end of 2001 and finalising the institutional arrangements with NATO and third countries. The Chief of Finnish Defence, General Gustav Hägglund, was selected by his peers as the first Chairman of the EU Military Committee. Earlier in 1998, Austria had been active in preparing the operationalisation of the defence dimension by inviting the defence ministers to a first unofficial meeting, thus initiating the practice of having defence ministers join foreign ministers at the Council or meet separately when issues to be discussed call for their expertise.

A further joint initiative by Finland and Sweden, in 2000, pushed forward the strengthening of the capability of the EU in civilian crisis management as an integral and complementary part of the reform of the CFSP that was launched by the new phase in the development of the com-
mon security and defence policy. Broad consensus has emerged in support of steps towards operationalising the EU capability in the field, starting with policing, as it had become clear that the civilian component was not aimed at interfering with the development of the headline goal but at complementing the overall capability of the Union in crisis management.

The impact of membership of the EU in the adaptation of the foreign and security policies of such non-allied members as Finland and Sweden is of particular complexity in the area of security and defence. On one hand, national defence is kept outside the Union *acquis* and special attention is required in the development of the EU-NATO relationship. On the other hand, both countries are engaged fully in the CFSP and the ESDP to augment the impact of their national policies and to promote common values and objectives. Participating in common policies of a global player, they are exposed to the socialisation and Europeanisation process, which is enlarging the scope and weight of issues being worked through the CFSP mechanism. The CFSP is not only a complement to national policy; it is also a factor that develops national foreign and security policy.

**Implications of the ESDP for transatlantic relations**

Coming from the tradition and practice of neutrality, and the northern European strategic environment with its sensitivities to great-power politics, Finland and Sweden are not natural adherents of either Europeanist or Atlanticist schools as developed in the European Community/Union over decades. For Finland and Sweden, the EU can be an avenue that combines and satisfies both orientations in a balanced manner. For geopolitical reasons they consider the US presence in Europe important while viewing the EU as their main instrument in promoting values and policy preferences based on common European history and identity. Moreover, Sweden and Finland are active and successful proponents of multilateral cooperation within the UN and the OSCE, which may influence their views of the objectives of the ESDP and the mandate issue of humanitarian interventions and EU-led operations.

The implications of the European Security and Defence Policy for security relations between the EU and the United States can be viewed from the perspective of the change launched in the Union by the ESDP, and the consequent response by the US, and the adaptation of NATO to the emergence of a new institutional player in military security management and defence policy developments in Europe.

On the basis of this approach, an analysis can be conducted around three concepts determining the impact of the ESDP on the role of the EU in international security management:

- **Competence:** determining such items as purpose, power as decision-making, and autonomy;
- **Capability:** performance, institutions, input and output contributions;
- **Authority:** power as prestige and leadership in governance; and order, influence and identity.

In these three dimensions, developments measure the autonomy of the EU in military crisis management and its linkage with the US/NATO as factors that constrain, guide and adapt the development and implementation of the ESDP. The degree of autonomy-linkage can be analysed against the preconditions set by the US for the effects of the ESDP on NATO and the transatlantic security link: decoupling-indivisibility; duplication-improvement; discrimination-inclusiveness.

The ESDP is not so much about the relationship between the EU and NATO as it is about the relationship between the EU and the US. The political, institutional and practical as well as military factors behind the EU’s drive in framing the defence aspects of the CFSP will shape the EU-US relationship.

The political factor is derived from the internal political dynamics of the Union, which are affected by ideational and power relations among members plus their perceptions of the objectives and direction that the common policies of the Union should pursue. The relation-
ship between the Europeanist and Atlanticist schools of transatlantic relations is a case in point.

The institutional factor is linked with the internal dynamics of the integration process. It is theoretical or ideological by nature in stressing the inevitability of the development of the Union towards a finalité goal that includes common defence. The theoretical-ideological approach stresses the integrity of the institutional structure of the Union and its internal rules of the game.

The practical factor is based on a pragmatic approach to the external challenges facing the Union. The response should be designed and measured according to the tasks at hand and the Union should be open to cooperation and partnership with other institutional players. There is less concern about the self-value of the Union, its institutions and separate objectives.

The military factor would be related to the protection of the territorial integrity of the Union and its members. It would become a motivating factor in case the members were to perceive an external threat and a security deficit. Such a situation would arise, for example, if NATO were to be dissolved or otherwise lose its credibility as a collective defence arrangement for members and non-allied members would lose confidence in their separate national defence.

In the broader context, the prospect of divergence vs. convergence between the EU and the US in their grand strategies of geopolitics, doctrine and military technology is emerging as a factor framing the evolution of the ESDP in US-EU relations. It is shaped by such issues as missile defence and international terrorism. The question asked is whether the security policy relationship between the European Union and the United States is being based on a division of labour or partnership or possibly in their combination.

The competence of the EU in military crisis management remains based on the fundamental principle of autonomy in decision-making, emphasizing the theoretical or ideological motivation and the perception of the ESDP/CFSP as a step in the historical development of EU integration. The political motivation shapes the degree of accommodation and competition in defining NATO as the institution of first choice in military crisis management. As states benefiting particularly from membership, Finland and Sweden are strong proponents of its decision-making autonomy and the cohesion and integrity of the unified institutional structure.

The competence, as tasks assigned by the EU for the ESDP, can be read in treaty-making, capabilities devoted to and strategies defined or scenarios assumed for EU-led missions. Although competence defined as tasks is an open-ended category, the formal and institutional limitations, reinforced by real and pragmatic politics, profile the Union as a junior partner to NATO in military crisis management. With active participation in the PfP, Finland and Sweden have no interest in duplicating efforts in resource generation and maintain a pragmatic approach to NATO’s leading role.

The generation of an EU capability for autonomous action in military crisis management, as envisaged in the decisions of the Union on resources assigned for the rapid reaction force and the institutional reform carried out in the Council structure for the political control and strategic direction of EU-led operations, will measure the political-military credibility of the ESDP and its significance for European security. In this context, the US is driving the discussion on the need for high-technology based defence reforms and armaments cooperation and integration.

The added value brought by the ESDP to the aggregate capabilities, primarily existing through NATO and its Partnership for Peace, for military crisis management in Europe will arise from the forces and collective capabilities developed, the enhanced institutional capability and new strategic culture created for dealing with political-military issues, the public and parliamentary support that is envisaged and also the intensified work on the capability for civilian crisis management, which further strengthens the EU’s position as a comprehensive player in stability and security promotion. As a distinct security entity, the EU is seen as performing military missions of less than maximum urgency.
The willingness to assign credible resources for EU-led missions is driven largely by pragmatic motivations, as there are no immediate or direct needs for military security of the EU or its members beyond the existing defence arrangements within NATO or separately outside the EU framework. Finland and Sweden are leading proponents of the pragmatic approach, which measures the need for an EU crisis management capability, augmented by an access to NATO resources, as a response to challenges in the European security environment.

The question of improvement in the generation of capabilities by the ESDP is centred on military planning. The implications of the ESDP for the regime of military crisis management are determined and controlled by the institutional relationships being established between the EU and NATO in strategic planning, force planning and operational planning.

The autonomy and identity of the EU are most effectively challenged by the US/NATO preponderance in planning. For the EU to maintain its decision-making autonomy over the whole process of an operation, a degree of autonomous planning is required. The relationship between EU planning and NATO defence planning remained open after the Nice/Brussels meetings in December 2000 and lingered on beyond the 2001 Gothenburg summit.

In strategic planning, NATO will perform an advisory and supporting role; in operational planning NATO’s integrated structure SHAPE will have the primary role as requested by the EU in each case. It is in force planning where most of the ambiguity exists and where the capacity of NATO is most critically guiding, augmenting and controlling the EU planning process.

Although pragmatic motivations prevail in the issue of planning as part of capabilities generation, ideological values of integration are touched upon as well, due to the need to assure the decision-making autonomy and identity of the Union. Moreover, the need to distinguish the alternative option of an autonomous EU-led operation without recourse to NATO assets, in particular by France, is based on political motivations. The militarily non-allied members have a pragmatic interest in building upon their work within the PfP/PARP as they prepare further their forces earmarked for EU-led operations under the headline goal.

As the EU is becoming operational in crisis management, initially during 2001, and finally in 2003, the ESDP will expand the authority of the Union in military security, reinforcing its established position in comprehensive security. At the same time, it is evident that NATO will remain the institution of choice for the most demanding cooperative military crisis management operations in Europe and the role of NATO will be emphasized increasingly as the primary platform and instrument of US security policy in Europe.

The development of the ESDP will enhance the hybridisation of the Union toward an international institution that covers all the sectors of security, excluding common defence proper but involving international military cooperation. The common security and defence policy of the EU remains initially European in its scope, complementing the global dimension of its political and economic role. As the US’s military security interests and capabilities are inherently global, complementing its global political and economic role, the relationship between the EU and the US will become increasingly complex in scope and substance.

For associated candidate states the ESDP has become an additional membership requirement. In EU-Russian relations, the ESDP has opened a new issue-area with a potential significance for the formation of the security order. The EU, governed by its common strategy and Northern Dimension, will assume increased significance as the overall partner of Russia in shaping European stability, security and unification and determining the lines of division in the European order. Finland and Sweden are closely involved in the EU-Russian cooperation.

Political motivations enhanced by ideological factors come to the fore in the issue of authority between the EU and the United States in international relations. Ultimately, this emphasis is true for Sweden and Finland as well, as European and American objectives and grand strategies continue to diverge under the global
security change. In determining its cooperative relations in military crisis management with third countries in Europe, the EU is asserting its comprehensive strategy for engagement and unification, addressing also the specific cases of Turkey and Russia. For the non-allied members, it is vital to benefit fully from their status as members of the Union, while they continue to adapt to the position of non-members of NATO in the PfP. In global security issues outside Europe, differences of approach between the EU and the United States reinforce the common profile of the EU.

**Summing up**

The profile of non-allied members of the EU, such as Finland and Sweden, in their policies towards transatlantic relations in the ESDP context is shaped by a combination of institutional, pragmatic and political motivations and incentives (see Figure 2).

In protecting and strengthening the competence of the Union, its decision-making autonomy and unified institutional structure, Finland and Sweden are driven, first of all, by the theoretical or ideological factor. They do not shy away from the long-term goals or ideals of the Union, although they do not encourage efforts to define them in any binding manner. Political and pragmatic factors would follow in that order.

In addressing the issue of the capability of the Union in military crisis management, Finland and Sweden primarily take a pragmatic approach. They are willing to use the EU-NATO link to maximum effect in supporting the development of the military resources of the Union and underpinning its missions. Here also, they would be keen on protecting the autonomy of the Union in the issue concerning the review of force planning, although they do not feel a need for NATO or the United States to be challenged politically as the leading players in military security.

Faced with the broader issue of authority in international relations, Finland and Sweden take a political approach connected with European ideas, values and traditions. Their past experience as small states or their non-aligned status does not bring them closer than other EU members to the US policies in global or regional security issues. On the other hand, Finland and Sweden would not perceive the Union necessarily as a global power in the same category as the United States but take a pragmatic and cooperative line when one is called for; and they value the stabilising role of the US in the northern European region.

The military factor is not an active consideration for Finland and Sweden as long as common defence is effectively off the agenda of the ESDP.

In this tentative analysis, the profile of Finland and Sweden in the ESDP is placed in the mainstream of the European Union. Being particular about the autonomy of the Union, pragmatic in EU-NATO cooperation on generating military resources, and political towards global security issues in the EU-US dialogue, Finland and Sweden contribute to the shaping of transatlantic relations in the field of military cooperation as effective players among the EU members. As long as common defence remains outside the effective development of the ESDP, the policy of military non-alliance is but one and not necessarily a decisive factor in shaping their role in political-military transatlantic relations.

6. Conclusions

Despite the dominant position of NATO in the military politics of European security, militarily non-allied members of the European Union...
are competent and effective players in military aspects of transatlantic relations and European security at large.

The role of non-allied states is evolving in the context of change in both of the principal security institutions, NATO and the European Union, and in the transformation in the subject matter and practice of military cooperation. The engagement and impact of Finland and Sweden reflect the explanatory power of the institutionalist model in an international order where players are searching for new and pragmatic solutions to common problems and challenges.

The contribution of Finland and Sweden to shaping the common security and defence policy of the EU demonstrates the dynamics and limits of adaptation as a source and cause of foreign policy change. Finland and Sweden have developed their participation in military and defence cooperation but kept the change within the limits of military non-alliance in accordance with their national objectives.

In the future, the ESDP will become more effective as a tool with which Finland and Sweden will be able to influence transatlantic relations and even contribute to change in power relations. Moreover, the constructivist model guides their orientation towards a more Europeanised or EU-channelled security and defence policy. At the same time, the realist forces place the non-allied states in a position of choice on the diverging paths between the EU and the United States and continue to affect their immediate security environment in a critical manner.

NOTES

Note: Statements of fact and opinion are those of the author and do not imply endorsement by the Finnish Government.

1 The changing military scene is reflected in a representative way in the OSCE seminar on defence policies and military doctrines held in 1990, 1991, and 1998 and in June 2001 (Seminar on military doctrines and defence policies in the OSCE area, Vienna, 11 to 13 June 2001, FSC.GAL/78/01/6 July 2001). Similarly indicative is the follow-up conference on the OSCE Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security, held in 1997 and 1999. While the previous forum brings together all the states of the OSCE region to discuss developments in the security environment, military doctrines and defence reforms, as well as military cooperation, the latter forum deals with rights and principles of states in the choice of their security and defence policies and in the use of armed forces for internal and external tasks.

2 The great debate on the main schools of thought is assessed in Katzenstein et al. (1998).

3 On the effectiveness of the three main theories of international relations in explaining transatlantic relations, see Duffield (2001). Likewise, foreign policy outcomes can be explained by three foreign policy theories built on the main theoretical schools; see Rittberger (2001) for case studies in German post-cold war foreign policy. A similar approach assessing the roles of power, governance and identity is applied on Finland’s policies towards the EU and NATO in Möttölä (2001c).

4 See Möttölä (1998) on the formative period of the security order after the end of the Cold War.


6 For a recent account of the Finnish and Swedish policies, including detailed information on domestic background factors, see Vahtoranta/Forsberg (2000) and Möttölä (2001c).

7 On Finland’s participation in the PfP, see Heikkilä (2000).

8 On the advantage of conscription-trained reservists as peacekeeping troops, see Tuomioja (2001).

9 Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations, adopted at the Meeting of the Euro-Atlan-
tic Partnership Council at Summit Level, Washington D.C., 25 April 1999. Finland and Sweden had similar unsatisfactory experience in their position as full EU members but mere observers in the WEU, which was developed as the defence arm of the Union until the decisions on developing the ESDP by the EU.


11 On the Swedish doctrine of security and defence policy, see the government’s white book, “Det nya försvaret (1999/2000)”; for the assessment on the absence of an invasion threat for at least ten years, see p. 12 and the recent analysis of the parliamentary defence committee, “Gränssöverskridande sårbarhet (2001)”; for a review of the Swedish doctrine, see pp. 214 ff. On the need to reassess the neutrality formulation, while maintaining military non-alliance, see foreign minister Anna Lindh’s statement in Riksdagen, 7 February 2001. For a comparative look at Finland and Sweden across the foreign and security policy issue-area, see Huldt et al. (2001).

12 According to a survey published by the MOD Commission on Defence Information, 5 July 2001, 68 per cent of the Finns are in favour of maintaining military non-alliance, while 21 per cent are for military alignment. When presented with alternatives of military alliance, 43 per cent pick NATO, 22 per cent are for the EU and 18 per cent for an alliance with Sweden. On the other hand, 53 per cent think that Finland is on its way to committing to NATO membership as a result of the multi-faceted cooperation underway. Recent figures in Sweden are 62 per cent against and 24 for joining military alliance.

13 Speaking notes by Finland and Sweden for a dialogue with NATO, 2 April 1997; Finland’s statement in connection with the Intensified Dialogue with NATO on the basis of the Study on Enlargement, 29 May 1996.

14 As noted by Torstila (1998), it was the first joint Finnish-Swedish mission to Moscow since 1939, when they addressed the security of the Åland Islands with the Soviet Union as one of the parties to the international treaty governing the demilitarised status of the Åland Islands. The Russian initiatives on Baltic Sea security are analysed in a broad regional framework in Mottölä (1999/2000).

15 Since the first RAND article on the issue of NATO enlargement (see Asmus et al. 1996), the question has been approached by the US in a broader framework.

16 The discussion on the Baltic dimension of NATO enlargement took an active turn among politicians and think-tank analysts in Washington, D.C., in early 2001, after the coming into power of the new US administration. In view of the forthcoming summit in Prague in late 2002, preparations and assessments leading to the US stand and consultations with the allies were being initiated at the same time. For a background study on the political and military feasibility of the official candidates (MAP countries) and the militarily non-allied EU members, see Szayna (2001), which also evaluates the strategic attractiveness of the Baltic States as well as Finland and Sweden for NATO from the purely military point of view. For an American analysis of strategic developments in the Baltic Sea region, see Perry/Sweeney/Winner (2000).

17 Increased interest and focus on Finland’s and Sweden’s stands was reflected in the international media from early 2001 on. See, for example, the interview of President Tarja Halonen in Der Spiegel, 9 April 2001. For the Swedish view stressing that it is the Swedish interest that the new democracies reach their security policy goals, see a statement by foreign minister Anna Lindh, 24 January 2001, and asserting that the end of the Cold War division is not complete in the region until Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have reached their security policy goals, see Gränssöverskridande sårbarhet, p. 210. Shortly after assuming his post on 4 June 2001, the new Chief of Finnish Defence, Admiral Juhani Kaskeala offered the assessment that the Baltic States’ membership of NATO would promote stability in the Baltic Sea region by removing uncertainty around the security implications of the minorities issue, whereas on 17 June 2001 Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen stressed the importance of the consolidation of the position of the Baltic States: there should be no grey zones in Finland’s vicinity. President Tarja Halonen, on 3 September 2001, in connection with President Putin’s visit to Finland, noted that the invitation to the Baltic States from NATO seemed to be a question of time.

18 A thorough analysis of the adaptation of Finland’s and Sweden’s foreign and security policy lines to EU membership and the development of the common security and defence policy is Ojanen et al. (2000), see also Herolf (1999) and Miles (2000). On the point that the firewall established by the assessment and calculation that the EU would not proceed to adopt common defence has been standing erect, providing Finland and Sweden with flexibility in their activity on the issue-area, see Möttölä (2001a).

19 The Finnish-Swedish initiative was taken after the Helsinki Summit. Sweden had been a vocal proponent of civilian crisis management from the beginning. Moreover, at Sweden’s initiative, an EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts was adopted by the Gothenburg Summit, stressing the importance of conflict prevention in the EU’s role.

20 This analysis is based on the ISA paper by Mottölä (2001b); for prospects of EU-NATO relations in crisis management, see Gartner (2001). For recent reports and studies on the ESDP and the EU-US rela-

The three D’s were modified by NATO Secretary General into three 1’s with a positive connotation; see Sloan (2000).

22 Implications of the widening military gap between the US and Europe are assessed in Gompert et al. (1999).

23 While in Austria a mutual EU security guarantee is debated as an alternative in future security solutions.

LIST OF REFERENCES


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